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VI. Additional Essays on the
Dedication Theme
On Legal Stability and Change
Edwin W. Patterson*
The paradox, "law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still,"
expresses one of the basic metaphysical aspects of law. Is law a Being
or a Becoming? Some would answer this question by saying that the
law is always a Becoming, a part of the eternal flux of human actions
and conditions. It is impossible, they may say, to enclose the law
in a logical system of norms, however well sanctioned. The important
things, then, are the motivations of the persons who effectuate legal
change (assuming these persons can be pointed out, which is not
always the case) or their justifications for change, their reasons given
to others in the community in the form of legal evaluations: policies,
principles, or ends-in-view. This view of law is an important one today. Never before, I believe, has there been such persistent questioning of a good many legal norms. The Becoming is about to swallow
up the Being.
The late Professor Morris R. Cohen pointed out that it would be
impossible to detect change without the conception of some stable
situation with which to compare it. Change from what? So in law
it has proved to be very useful to adopt, for several purposes, a photoflash of the body of law as viewed at some twenty-five milliseconds
of time. A better analogy for legal analysis is the accountant's balance
sheet, reported as of December 31, of a given year, of the assets and
liabilities of a life insurance company. Such a sheet can be highly
reliable as to its main items, yet it will contain some minor guesses
such as, "losses not yet reported." So if the literary sources of the law
are examined expertly as of any December 31 or any other date, the
set of rules, principles, policies, and standards can be formulated with
a fair degree of reliability. By using broader concepts and classifications the assemblage can be given a status resembling, yet hardly
approximating, the perfect system of the logician.
This second way of dealing with a body of law may be called
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analytical, and in its broader reaches it becomes analytical jurisprudence. It is sometimes called "legal positivism," a term that I dislike
because of its association with Auguste Comte on the one hand, and
on the other hand because of its being confused with a later movement
known as "Logical Positivism." A third reason for rejecting this term,
"legal positivism," is that various writers, including especially some of
the natural-law followers, have applied this label and then assumed
that analytical jurists are necessarily not interested in what law ought
to be or even in what it is coming to be. Both of these assumptions
are false. Even such a minor increment to analytical theory as Holmes'
prediction theory of law was intended to explain the work of the
counselor or advocate, and in the latter part of the same essay he
urged that judges should have reasons of social advantage for their
decisions. This looks to the law of the future. Holland, Salmond, and
Paton, in addition to engaging in legal analysis, have all discussed
what law should be. Only Kelsen maintains, it seems, an extreme
position on this point. The hardest things for me to accept in Kelsen
are his "and nots."'
This controversy between the schools in the United States has not
become bitter or vituperative, and I fervently hope it may not. If the
foregoing sketch is correct, both analytical jurists and ideal-law men
take account of both the Being and the Becoming of law. Differences
in emphasis and on some issues remain.
But, it may be said, the analytic jurists look only at the letters of
the text and give them a literal meaning. Now I have known lawyers
and judges who did just that, and I do not recommend them. I know
of no legal theorist who does. In truth, may we not say that the
Being of law, its peculiar kind of "existence" (if any), is in a realm
of meanings, and in this realm the range of possible "oughts" of a legal
norm or doctrine are to be included. To give but one example, does
not the requirement of "mutual assent" for the formation of a (certain
type of) contract imply the expectation concept, the concept of individual autonomy, and also the concept of bargain or exchange? I
am inclined to believe it clearly includes the first two and that the
third, bargain, distinguishes this type of contract from gift promises,
enforceable because of a seal or estoppel.
The pressure for new laws may come from within the legal profession, or from outsiders. The latter more frequently happens. The
law has been asked to do things hardly conceived to be possible,
for example, to coerce employer and employees to "bargain collec1. Kelsen's analysis of subordinate lawmaldng explains in another way (than the one
suggested here) the relation between the Being and the Becoming of law. See my
Hans Kelsen and His Pure Theory of Law, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 5 (1952).
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tively." How could a court shape a decree that would do? The
demands came from thousands of workers who were unemployed in
1932-1933, as well as from the labor unions. Fortunately the drafting
was done by a brilliant lawyer, and the legal changes brought about
by the Wagner Act2 were important and, for the most part, I
believe, useful. On the other hand, the legal changes brought about
by Brown v. Board of Education,3 in which the Supreme Court
ordered Negro pupils admitted without discrimination to schools
attended by predominantly white pupils, have not been as fully and
smoothly effectuated. There are several differences between the two
situations, yet the principal one, I believe, is that the Court-made
rule lacks an administrative agency, such as the National Labor Relations Board, to work out details at a level into which judges do not
customarily enter.
Responses to demands for legal change should be made by the
legislature, and not usually by the courts, who are not situated to
call public hearings before adopting injunctions or rules. Legislation
has, indeed, been the usual method of legal change. Law in its
society must respond to some of the demands or pressures that come
from its society. The objectives of a proposed change may be clear,
yet the organs of government are justified in choosing and even
admonished to choose the best means of attaining these ends with the
least sacrifice of other ends, or in refusing to act if no effective and
justifiable means are available.
2. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1958).
3. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

